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THE REASSERTION OF THE PRIMACY OF DELAWARE AND 
FORUM SELECTION BYLAWS 
Patrick J. Rohl 
* 
I. OVERVIEW 
Most mergers involving public companies face lawsuits,
2
 thereby 
imposing what some have described as a “merger tax” on the transac-
tions.
3
 Likewise, derivative suits often arise in more than one jurisdic-
tion. Additionally, concerns have arisen over the settlement costs associ-
ated with derivative suits.
4
 
Although other mechanisms for consolidating these disputes exist, 
attention has focused on the increased use of forum selection bylaws. 
These bylaws require the filing of intra-corporate disputes in a specified 
forum. For the most part, this has meant Delaware. As a result, litigation 
is centralized in a single jurisdiction, eliminating multiple lawsuits.  
Shareholders have challenged these bylaws. Although upheld in 
Delaware, the decisions in other jurisdictions have been mixed. State 
courts in at least eight states, listed in the appendix, have acknowledged 
the facial validity of forum selection bylaws unilaterally adopted by a 
board.
 
One, however, declined to enforce a bylaw.
5
 The court determined 
that the board’s actions violated Oregon public policy and, as a result, 




 * J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law. 
 2. Bryce Cullinane, Unilateral Forum Selection Clauses in Corporate Bylaws: A Synopsis of 
the Debate, 7 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 485, 485-86 (2014). 
 3. Leo E. Strine, Jr. et. al., Putting Stockholders First, Not the First-Filed Complaint, 69 
BUS. LAW. 1, 12-13 (2013) 
(“We think otherwise: multi-forum litigation does engender costs, and those costs are non-trivial.”). 
One study estimated that nearly three-fourths of derivative suits of public companies involve multi-
ple jurisdictions. Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination, 
97 IOWA L. REV. 49, 54 (2011) (“Approximately 80% of the public company suits were accompa-
nied by two or more parallel lawsuits.”).  
 4. Dave Bradford, Shareholder Derivative Suits: A Growing Concern for Corporate Direc-
tors and Officers, CNA (Jul. 2005), available at 
http://cnapro.com/pdf/ShareholderDeriviativeSuits_Advisen.pdf (“Shareholder derivative suits are 
increasingly filed in tandem with securities class action suits. This trend should be of concern to 
corporate directors and officers. If the securities class action suit exhausts the insurance recoveries 
available from a company's traditional D&O insurance policy, directors and officers may find them-
selves without coverage for the defense costs and any monetary settlement of the shareholder deriva-
tive suit.”). 
 5. Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., No. 1402-02441 (Ore. Cir. Ct. August 14, 
2014); http://www.wlrk.com/docs/Triquint_oregon.pdf 
 6. Id.  
144 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 92 
sions have suggested that bylaws adopted after the filing of an action will 
be subject to successful challenge.
7
 
This paper will discuss the problems associated with filing deriva-
tive suits in multiple jurisdictions and the possible solution offered by 
forum selection bylaws. The discussion will include an analysis of the 
provisions now being adopted by corporations. The paper will also dis-
cuss the legal validity of these provisions under Delaware law and the 
reception accord this approach by out of state courts. Finally, the paper 
will examine possible responses to these developments.  
II. BOARDS AND BYLAWS 
Bylaws prescribe the rules and regulations of the corporation.
8
 Un-
der Delaware law, shareholders have the authority to adopt bylaws.
9
 Di-
rectors may also do so but only if the authority appears in the certificate 
of incorporation.
10
 Bylaws can include “any provision, not inconsistent 
with the law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the busi-
ness of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers 
of its stockholders, directors, officers, or employees.”
11
 Once adopted, a 
corporation’s bylaws are presumed to be valid.
12
  
Courts provide directors with broad discretion to adopt bylaws de-
signed to regulate the internal affairs of the corporation. These include 
bylaws requiring advance notice to the board of any proposals or director 
nominees that will be introduced at a meeting of shareholders.
13
 Dela-
ware courts have held that these bylaws help bring organization and effi-
ciency to board meetings.
14
 Courts have likewise approved bylaws regu-
lating indemnification and the advancement of expenses in litigation. 
15
  
In construing bylaws, Delaware courts have described the provi-




 7. Cobb v. Ironwood Country Club, 233 Cal. App. 4th 960, 963 (2015). 
 8. Bonnie White, Reevaluating Galaviz v. Berg: An Analysis of Forum-Selection Provisions 
in Unilaterally Adopted Corporate Bylaws As Requirements Contracts, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 390, 392 
(2012). 
 9. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8 § 109(a) (2015). 
 10. Id.  
 11. § 109(b). 
 12. Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985). 
 13. Jana Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 344 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 14. AB Value Partners, LP v. Kreisler Mfg. Corp., No. CV 10434-VCP, 2014 WL 7150465, 
at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2014) (“Such bylaws are said to be useful in permitting orderly shareholder 
meetings, but if notice requirements unduly restrict the stockholder franchise or are applied inequita-
bly, they will be struck down.”). See also Katz v. Common Wealth REIT, No. 24–C–13–001299, 
slip op., at 22–26 (Md. Cir. Ct. Feb. 19, 2014) (A Maryland court held a board adopted arbitration 
bylaw valid and enforceable.). 
 15. Underbrink v. Warrior Energy Servs. Corp., No. CIV.A. 2982-VCP, 2008 WL 2262316, 
at *11 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008) (“With respect to the mandatory advancement bylaw, the court held 
the plaintiffs pled no facts which suggest that the bylaw amendment at issue is unreasonable in this 
case. Therefore, it is not subject to further scrutiny by this court.”) 
 16. Airgas, Inc. v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010).  
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therefore, often rely on contract principles when construing the language 
of a bylaw.
17
 As a result, resolution of interpretive issues may depend 
upon the intent of the parties.
18
 Nonetheless, the meaning of bylaws is 
not limited to principles of contract. Delaware courts have also adopted 




The facial validity of a bylaw does not guarantee enforceability. 
“[I]nequitable action does not become possible just because it is legally 
permissible under the Delaware General Corporation Law.”
20
 The appli-
cation of equity requires a two-prong test.
21
 Bylaws will be inequitable if 
resulting from fraud, undue influence or overweening bargaining pow-
er.
22
 Likewise, a bylaw will be inequitable to the extent “unreasonable 
and unjust.” 
23
 In applying equity, Delaware courts will consider both the 
purpose of the bylaw and the effect.
24
  
III. THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLE DERIVATIVE SUITS 
Disputes between shareholders and directors were traditionally 
brought in the state of incorporation.
25
 Determining the state of for-
mation, therefore, effectively resulted in the selection of the forum.
26
 
Most public companies chose Delaware.
27
  
Beginning around the new millennium, however, data suggests that 
derivative suits against Delaware corporations were increasingly filed in 
other jurisdictions.
28
 A number of reasons have been asserted to explain 
the phenomena. Some have suggested that jurisdictions outside of Dela-
ware have a more receptive view towards the payment of the legal fees 
  
 17. Id. (“Corporate charters and bylaws are contracts among a corporation's shareholders; 
therefore, our rules of contract interpretation apply.”). 
 18. Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1134 (Del. 1990) (“Courts must give effect to the 
intent of the parties as revealed by the language of the certificate and the circumstances surrounding 
its creation and adoption.”). 
 19. Airgas, 8 A.3d at 1188. (“If charter or bylaw provisions are unclear, we resolve any doubt 
in favor of the stockholders' electoral rights.”). 
 20. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439-40 (Del. 1971). 
 21. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13, 92 S. Ct. 1907, 1914-16, 32 L. Ed. 
2d 513 (1972). 
 22. Id.  
 23. Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1146 (Del. 2010). 
 24. Airgas, 8 A.3d at 1188.  
 25. Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection 
Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 376 (2012). 
 26. Id.  
 27. Lewis S. Black, Jr., Why Corporations Choose Delaware, STATE OF DEL. (2007), availa-
ble at http://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf. 
 28. Robert M. Daines & Olga Koumrian, Shareholder Litigation Involving Mergers and 
Acquisitions, CORNERSTONE RES. (Feb. 2013), available at 
https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/9d8fd78f-7807-485a-a8fc-4ec4182dedd6/2012-
Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-M-and-A.pdf. (“Before 2002, most M&A lawsuits were filed in 
the Delaware Court of Chancery. From 2002 through 2007, much of this litigation moved to other 
states (a phenomenon sometimes called the flight from Delaware.”) 
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incurred by counsel for shareholders.
29
 Others have contended that these 
jurisdictions were less management friendly in their decision-making.
30
  
Reforms in other jurisdictions may also have eliminated advantages 
previously offered by Delaware.
31
 In the past, Delaware was among the 
states most willing to allow pro hac vice motions.
32
 Other states, howev-
er, have become more liberal in granting these motions.
33
 This national 
trend has allowed counsel to create strong relationships with judiciaries 
in states other than Delaware.
34
  
Finally, the increase in the number of actions outside of Delaware 
may have a strategic explanation. 
35
 Some jurisdictions designate the first 
to file an action as lead counsel.
36
 Delaware, however, looks to other 
criteria such as stock ownership and the skill of the law firm.
37
 Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys may, therefore, be incentivized to file in a jurisdiction with the 
most appealing provisions for designating lead counsel.
38
  
Litigation in multiple jurisdictions imposes costs directly on com-
panies and indirectly on shareholders.
39
 Likewise, the increased filing of 
cases in other jurisdictions has the potential to diminish the role of Dela-
ware in the interpretation of corporate law. As one academic noted: 
“Delaware law would be less developed (due to the smaller number of 
cases), possibly become less coherent (due to the presence of decisions 
  
 29. Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection 
Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 376 (2012). 
 30. Adam B. Badawi, Merger Class Actions in Delaware and the Symptoms of Multi-
Jurisdictional Litigation, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 965, 974 (2013) (“This [management friendly] behav-
ior may have led to plaintiffs' attorneys taking cases to courts where the judiciary did not share these 
sentiments.”).  
 31. Id. at 975. 
 32. Id. at 976 (“The authors argue that being at the forefront of this approach allowed out-of-
state counsel to forge strong relationships both with in-state counsel and with the Delaware judici-
ary. As other states have become more willing to allow out-of-state counsel to appear, parallel rela-
tionships may be forming elsewhere in a way that contributes to cases leaving Delaware.”). 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 975. 
 36. Id. at 968 (“Given that foreign jurisdictions often select lead counsel on the basis of the 
first to file the case, out-of-state counsel who lose the race to the courthouse have little to gain by 
filing in that foreign jurisdiction.”). 
 37. Id. (“If, however, these counsel have a plausible chance at being named as lead counsel in 
Delaware--where the selection of lead counsel largely depends on the size of a plaintiffs' sharehold-
ings and the perceived quality of its law firm--they can file in Delaware.”). 
 38. Id. (Additionally, Delaware law is currently unclear on whether a shareholder represents 
the corporation before there is a determination of “demand excusal” or “demand futility.” Therefore, 
fast-flier plaintiffs may be incentivized to file outside of Delaware. The Delaware Supreme Court 
“seemingly left open the possibility of a rebuttable presumption that fast-filing plaintiffs are inade-
quate representatives of the corporation.”). 
 39. Settlements of Shareholder Litigation Involving Mergers and Acquisitions: Review of 
2013 M&A Litigation, CORNERSTONE RES. (2014), available at 
https://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/7bd80347-124b-4b69-add5-575e33c3f61b/Settlements-
of-Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Me.aspx (Plaintiff attorneys’ requested an average fee of 1.1 
million dollars per derivative suit in 2013. The precise amount of fees actually paid were not, how-
ever, reported.). 
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decided by other courts), and its judiciary could lose part of its expertise 
(due to the smaller number of cases heard).”
40
 The result would also re-
duce the attractiveness of the state as a place to incorporate.
41
  
To some degree, the courts could resolve the problem by consolidat-
ing all cases in a single jurisdiction. Such an approach would not, how-
ever, prevent the filing of multiple lawsuits. Moreover, courts would 
have to wait for the defendant to file the requisite “one forum motion” in 
pending jurisdictions.
42





III. FORUM SELECTION BYLAWS 
Forum selection bylaws represent a possible solution to the problem 
of lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions. These provisions provide an ability 
to restrict suits involving a corporation’s internal affairs to a single state 
or court.
44
 The provisions have proved popular. First used in 2007 by 
Netsuite, over 100 companies adopted forum selection provisions be-
tween July and November of 2013.
45
 By December 2014, more than 250 
publicly traded companies had these bylaws in place.
46
 
A. The Terms of the Bylaws 
Corporations utilizing forum selection bylaws have generally fol-
lowed a template similar to Netsuite.
47
 First, they designate an exclusive 
  
 40. Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive 
Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 157-58 (2011). 
 41. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear 
Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 751 (2009). 
 42. C. Barr Flinn and Kathaleen St. J. McCormick, The Delaware Court of Chancery Endors-
es Motions as a Solution to Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation Young, Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP 
(2011), available at 
http://www.youngconaway.com/files/Uploads/Documents/CorporateFall2011[1].pdf  
See also (“[The Defendant should] go into all the Courts in which the matters are pending and file a 
common motion that would be in front of all of the judges that are implicated, asking those judges to 
please confer and agree upon, in the interest of comity and judicial efficiency, if nothing else, what 
jurisdiction is going to proceed and go forward and which jurisdictions are going to stand down and 
allow one jurisdiction to handle the matter.”) In re Allion Healthcare Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. 
CIV.A. 5022-CC, 2011 WL 1135016, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011). 
 43. Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive 
Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 158-59 (2011) (“The approach relies on judges in 
various jurisdictions coordinating litigation in the interests of comity and judicial efficiency. There is 
no guarantee that judges will agree to coordinate cases, especially high profile cases.”). 
 44. Id. at 164. 
 45. See Claudia H. Allen, Trends in Exclusive Forum Bylaws, 3 (Jan. 2015); 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411715 
 46. Andrew B. Kratenstein, Delaware Court of Chancery Upholds Forum Selection Bylaws, 
Winter 2014; http://www.mwe.com/Inside-MA---Winter-2014/ 
 47. Claudia H. Allen, Study of Delaware Forum Selection Charters and Bylaws, (2012) (“The 
forum selection charter provision adopted by Netsuite, Inc. in 2007 has effectively served as the 
template for the current generation of exclusive forum provisions.”); 
http://www.kattenlaw.com/Files/45103_Jan_%202012_Forum_Study.pdf 
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jurisdiction. Most also permit an alternative forum when the board con-
sents, effectively providing a “fiduciary out” if in the best interest of the 
corporation.
48
 More than half of these provisions include language in-




The bylaws also specify the types of actions covered by the provi-
sion. The typical provision covers actions for breach of a fiduciary duty 
owed by any director, officer, or employee; any action asserting a claim 
pursuant to the Delaware General Corporation Law or the certificate of 
incorporation or bylaws; or any action asserting a claim pertaining to the 
internal affairs of the corporation.
50
 One common variation requires that 
the selected forum have personal jurisdiction over the “indispensable 
party.” Another deviation from the Netsuite model has been a shift away 
from granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery.
51
 Many corporations, in “an apparent effort to ensure the effective-
ness of the bylaw in light of the Court of Chancery's jurisdictional limita-
tions,” have instead selected “state or federal courts in Delaware.”
52
 Oth-
ers designate the state or federal courts where they are headquartered.
53
  
B. The Validity of the Bylaws  
The first court to consider the validity of a forum selection bylaw 
unilaterally adopted by the board struck down the provision.
54
 In Galaviz 
v. Berg,
55
 the shareholders asserted that the company failed to provide 
the government with certain discounts, resulting in significant over-
charges.
56
 After the behavior occurred but before any action was filed, 
the board of directors adopted a bylaw designating Delaware as the fo-
rum for all intra-corporate disputes.
57
 Shareholders filed suit in Califor-
nia and argued that the forum selection clause was unenforceable.
58
  
In defending the bylaw, Defendants relied on principles of contract. 
In applying this approach, the court found that the adoption of the bylaw 
  
 48. See Claudia H. Allen, Trends in Exclusive Forum Bylaws, THE CONF. BOARD DIRECTOR 
NOTES (Jan. 2015), available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411715 
(According to one study, 97% have chosen to include it.). 
 49. Id.  
 50. Forum Selection Bylaw adopted by National Bank Holdings Corporation. 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1475841/000147584114000058/nbhc_20140930ex32.htm 
Section 10.2 Article X page 21.  
 51. Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection 
Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 364 (2012). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Michael Van Gorder, Boilermakers v. Chevron: Are Board Adopted Arbitration Bylaws 
Valid Under the Delaware General Corporation Law?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 443, 446 (2014). 
 55. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 56. Id. at 1172 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 1173 
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lacked mutual consent between the board and shareholders.
59
 The De-
fendant had “not pointed to any commercial contract case upholding a 
venue provision that was inserted by a purported unilateral amendment to 
existing contract terms.”
60
 Moreover, the provision at issue was “adopted 
by the directors who [were] defendants in this action, after the majority 
of the purported wrongdoing [was] alleged to have occurred, and without 
the consent of existing shareholders who acquired their shares when no 
such bylaw was in effect.”
61
 Accordingly, the court held the bylaw unen-
forceable. 
C. Chevron  
In the aftermath of Galaviz, shareholders of a dozen large U.S. 
companies filed complaints against their respective boards for unilateral-
ly adopting forum selection bylaws.
62
 In response, ten companies re-




In Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.,
64
 the 
Chancery Court upheld as facially valid bylaws adopted by Chevron and 
FedEx that granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Delaware Courts for in-
tra-corporate disputes. In assessing facial validity, the Chancery Court 
noted that the Delaware Code authorized bylaws that related to the 
“business of the corporation.”
65
 The bylaw did so by “channeling internal 
affairs cases into the courts of the state of incorporation.”
66
  
The court emphasized the contractual nature of bylaws.
67
 Investors 
understood at the time of the acquisition of shares that the board had the 
ability to unilaterally adopt bylaws. Accordingly, additional shareholder 
consent was unnecessary. The bylaws were not, however, always valid in 
practice. As the court noted: “the real-world application of a forum selec-
tion bylaw can be challenged as an inequitable breach of fiduciary du-
ty.”
68
 The court, however, did not address whether the bylaws at issue 
were invalid as applied.  
  
 59. Id. at 1171. 
 60. Id. at 1174. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 944 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(“Within the course of three weeks in February 2012, a dozen complaints were filed in this court 
against Delaware corporations, including Chevron and FedEx, whose boards had adopted forum 
selection bylaws without stockholder votes.”). 
 63. Id. at 945  
 64. 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 65. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8 § 109(b) (2015). 
 66. Chevron, 73 A.3d at 951.  
 67. Id. at 939 
 68. Id. at 954.  
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IV. FORUM SELECTION BYLAWS “AS-APPLIED” 
Although finding forum selection bylaws facially valid, the court in 
Chevron left open the possibility that they could be challenged as inequi-
table.
69
 The as-applied challenge exists “precisely to ensure that facially 
valid forum selection clauses are not used in an unreasonable manner in 
particular circumstances.”
70
 That said, a forum clause should be enforced 




A. Post Chevron Cases in Delaware  
Delaware courts have so far proved unwilling to invalidate the use 
of forum selection bylaws when challenged as inequitable. In City of 
Providence,
72
 the plaintiff contested a bylaw adopted by First Citizens 
Bancorporation that gave exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of North 
Carolina.
73




City of Providence asserted that the bylaw had been adopted on the 
same day the company announced a merger and was intended to provide 
the board with a more favorable forum in the event of litigation.
75
 Plain-
tiff also argued that the Chancery Court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear 
all matters relating to the Delaware General Corporation Law, effectively 
prohibiting the designation of another state as the exclusive forum.
76
  
Rejecting these arguments, the court determined that “[there was] 
no basis to infer, even under the reasonable conceivability standard, that 
the forum selection bylaw was the product of a breach of fiduciary du-
ty.”
77
 Rather than shield the board from judicial review, the bylaw only 
attempted to centralize litigation in a single jurisdiction.
78
 Moreover, 
nothing about the application of the bylaw was unreasonable.
79
 As for the 
claim of exclusive jurisdiction, the court found that Delaware law did not 
  
 69. Id. at 958.  
 70. Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., No. 1402-02441 (Ore. Cir. Ct. August 14, 2014). 
 71. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S. Ct. 1907, 1916, 32 L. Ed. 2d 
513 (1972) (“Thus, in the light of present-day commercial realities and expanding international trade 
we conclude that the forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set 
aside.”). 
 72. City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 235 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 73. City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 235 (Del. Ch. 2014) 
(“the fact that the Board selected the federal and state courts of North Carolina—the second most 
obviously reasonable forum given that FC North is headquartered and has most of its operations 
there—rather than those of Delaware as the exclusive forums for intra-corporate disputes does not, 
in my view, call into question the facial validity of the Forum Selection Bylaw.”). 
 74. Id. at 234.  
 75. Plaintiff gave no reason for why North Carolina would be more favorable forum.  
 76. Id. at 235. 
 77. City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., No. CIV.A. 9795-CB, 2014 WL 
4409816, at *237 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2014). 
 78. Id. at 236. 
 79. Id. at 240 
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Companies with forum selection bylaws designating Delaware con-
tinue to be subject to derivative suits and other actions relating to the 
internal affairs in other states. They have sometimes sought relief by 
asking Delaware courts to enjoin parties filing actions outside of the 
state. The approach, however, has not met with significant success.  
In Genoud v. Edgen Group, Inc.,
81
 a Canadian citizen brought suit 
in Louisiana against the directors and controlling shareholder of Edgen 
Group, a Delaware corporation, for a breach of fiduciary duty.
82
 Having 
adopted a forum selection clause granting exclusive jurisdiction to the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, Edgen Group filed an injunctive proceed-
ing seeking to prevent the continuation of the action in Louisiana. The 
Delaware Court held that the shareholder violated the forum selection 
provision but declined to issue the injunction.
83
 The court noted concerns 
with personal jurisdiction.
84
 Owning stock in a Delaware corporation was 
arguably not enough to confer personal jurisdiction over the shareholder 
filing the action.
85
 Louisiana, however, honored the forum selection pro-
vision and dismissed the case for improper venue.
86
 
IV. THE RECEPTION OF FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS  
The reception of courts outside of Delaware to the Chevron decision 
has generally been favorable. No court since Galaviz has facially invali-
dated forum selection bylaws. As a result, they have rejected challenges 
based upon the unilateral adoption by the board.
87
 Additionally, most 
have declined to overturn the bylaw as inequitable.  
As-applied challenges have also, for the most part, been rejected. 
Courts have considered claims that a forum selection bylaw was “unrea-
sonable or inequitable.”
88
 Most such arguments have centered around 
adoption after alleged wrong doing. Courts, however, have been unwill-
ing to invalidate bylaws in these circumstances. California courts have 
  
 80. Id. at 235 (The Chancery Court determined plaintiff’s interpretation would violate of the 
Supremacy Clause and federal diversity jurisdiction.). 
 81. Genoud v. Edgen Group, Inc., No. 625244, 2014 WL 2782221, at *1 (La. Dist. Ct. Jan. 
17, 2014). 
 82. Id.  
 83. Genoud v. Edgen Group, Inc. No. 9055-VCL, at 43 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2013), available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/110513tc9055vcljl.pdf  
 84. Id. at 4. 
 85. Id. at 7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2013 (“Historically, as a general rule, simply owning stock in a 
Delaware corporation is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on a Delaware Court.”). 
 86. Genoud, supra note 77, at *1.  
 87. See Cobb v. Ironwood Country Club, 233 Cal. App. 4th 960, 963 (2015). 
 88. Id.  
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upheld the bylaws where the plaintiff alleged their adoption was an effort 
to shield the board from litigation after wrongdoing.
89
 Similarly, an Ohio 
court found that a forum selection clause did not become unenforceable 
because it was adopted after the purported wrongdoing.
90
 
Courts have not, however, always upheld the bylaws. At least one 
state court found a bylaw unenforceable due its proximity with alleged 
wrongdoing.
91
 The Oregon court did so by adding a requirement that the 
bylaw not violate public policy.
92
 The court determined that enforcement 
of a bylaw after alleged wrongdoing and in anticipation of a specific law-




Likewise, a California court invalidated a bylaw mandating arbitra-
tion that was adopted four months after an action filed against the board. 
The court accepted the characterization of the bylaw as a contract and 
applied the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The principle pre-
cluded “amendments that operate[d] retroactively to impair accrued 
rights.”
94
 The board’s actions “unreasonably interfere[d] with the oppos-
ing party’s expectations regarding how the agreement applied to those 
claims.”
95




The Delaware Chancery court has approved the use of forum selec-
tion bylaws unless inequitable. States outside of Delaware have generally 
adopted this approach. An Oregon court, however, has added an addi-
  
 89. Groen v. Safeway, Inc., No. RG14716641, slip op., at 1–2, 2014 WL 
3405752 (Super.Ct.Cal., Alameda Cnty., May 14, 2014); Brewerton v. Oplink 
Communications Inc (Super. Ct. Cal. Alameda Cnty, Dec. 12, 2014). See 
http://investor.oplink.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1104659-14-86731  Item 8.  
 90. N. v. McNamara, 1:13-CV-833, 2014 WL 4684377 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2014). The court 
rejected the ruling in Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., No. 1402-02441 (Ore. Cir. Ct. August 
14, 2014) (“Corporation's adoption of Delaware forum-selection by-law after purported wrongdoing 
of corporate officers and directors did not have improper purpose, and thus was enforceable, since 
by-law allowed for consolidation of litigation brought on behalf of Delaware corporation into single 
forum to reduce costs and prevent duplication, and by-law did not insulate officers and directors 
from suit, and proceeding in Delaware courts would not have been unfairly advantageous to interests 
of officers and directors.”). Found at http://www.wlrk.com/docs/Triquint_oregon.pdf 
 91. Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., No. 1402-02441 (Ore. Cir. Ct. 
August 14, 2014), Groen v. Safeway, Inc., No. RG14716641, slip op., at 1–2, 
2014 WL 3405752 (Super. Ct. Cal., Alameda Cnty., May 14, 2014). 
 92. Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., No. 1402-02441 (Ore. Cir. Ct. August 14, 2014). 
 93. Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., No. 1402-02441 (Ore. Cir. Ct. August 14, 2014) 
. 
 94. Cobb v. Ironwood Country Club, No. G050446, 2015 WL 358794, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Jan. 28, 2015). 
 95. Id. at *3. 
 96. Id.  See also In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 922 F. Supp. 2d 445, 
463 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (declining to enforce forum selection provision in articles that was not in effect 
at the time plaintiffs purchased shares in IPO).    
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tional element and invalidated a bylaw adopted after alleged wrong doing 
as against public policy. In addition, a California court held that a bylaw 
mandating arbitration violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
when adopted after an action was filed. Accordingly, bylaws adopted in 
close proximity to behavior likely to be challenged or after a claim has 
been filed have greater risk of being invalidated. Boards can reduce the 
likelihood by adopting the bylaws at a time when no threatened or actual 
litigation is pending.  
Even if legally valid, however, forum selection bylaws raise other 
concerns. In one survey, 72% of investors agreed that a board should not 
unilaterally adopt a bylaw that restricted the rights of shareholders.
97
 
Proxy advisory firms have expressed concerns, at least where the bylaws 
were adopted without shareholder involvement.
98
 The unilateral adoption 
of these bylaws, therefore, may weaken the relationship between man-
agement and shareholders.  
Perhaps reflecting some legal uncertainty, the Corporation Law 
Council, a committee of the Delaware State Bar Association, submitted 
draft legislation that would authorize forum selection bylaws by stat-
ute. Specifically, the legislation confirms that a corporation, through its 
certificate of incorporation and bylaws, has the authority to select Dela-
ware as an exclusive forum for intra corporate disputes arising under the 
Delaware General Corporation Law. In addition, however, the proposal 
would overturn the reasoning in City of Providence v. First Citizens 
BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 235 (Del. Ch. 2014) that would allow 
companies incorporated in Delaware to select an exclusive forum in an-
other jurisdiction, such as where it is headquartered. The proposal does 
so by invalidating provisions that preclude Delaware Courts from hear-
ing or arbitrating a case. The legislation, however, fails to address the 
validity of a provision selecting Delaware and an additional forum out-
side of the state. That being said, forums outside of Delaware may be 
selected after shareholders have given written consent. Accordingly, the 
future reception of unilaterally adopted forum selection bylaws granting 
exclusive jurisdiction to a single state has become even less certain.  
  
 97. See Policy 2014–2015 Policy Survey Summary of Results, ISS (Sep. 2014), available at 
http://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/ISS2014-2015PolicySurveyResultsReport.pdf 
 98. Glass Lewis on Exclusive Forum Provisions, GLASS LEWIS & CO. (Sep. 25, 2013), 
http://www.glasslewis.com/blog/glass-lewis-on-exclusive-forum-provisions/ (“Glass Lewis believes 
that such exclusive forum bylaws are generally not in shareholders’ interests since they unnecessari-
ly limit full legal recourse by preventing shareholders from bringing suit in a forum of their choos-
ing. Like for other bylaw provisions that affect shareholder rights, Glass Lewis believes shareholders 
should have the opportunity to vote on the adoption of such bylaws.”); see also ISS, supra note 90. 
(“While this authority may benefit shareholders by allowing the board to address routine matters 
without the expense or delay caused by holding a meeting, this authority can also be used to adopt 
provisions that may be adverse to shareholders' interests.” ISS recommends evaluating each case on 
a case-by-case basis.). 
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The ability for corporations to adopt forum selection provisions 
will, however, ensure that Delaware retains its influence in the develop-
ment of corporate law.
99
 This, however, could have negative long-term 
effects.
100
 Access to non-Delaware courts to interpret Delaware law cur-
rently serves as a check and balance.
101
 If shareholders become deprived 





 99. Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive 
Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 165 (2011). 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 187. 
 102. Id.  
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Appendix of cases by state that have acknowledged the facial va-
lidity of forum selection bylaws unilaterally adopted by the board: 
1. California  
a. Groen v. Safeway, Inc., No. RG14716641, 2014 WL 
3405752, at * 1–2 (Super. Ct. Cal. May 14, 2014), avail-
able at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/files/2014/06/safeway-MTDopinion.pdf 
b. Brewerton v. Oplink Communications Inc., No. RG14-
750111 (Super. Ct. Cal. Dec. 12, 2014), available at 
http://investor.oplink.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=11046
59-14-86731 
c. Cobb v. Ironwood Country Club, No. G050446, 2015 





a.  City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., 99 




a. Melissa's Trust v. Seton, No. 14 C 02068, 2014 WL 
3811241 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2014), available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/illinois/ilndce/1:2014cv02068/294052/33 
b. Miller v. Beam, Inc., No.2014 CH 00932, Tr. of Oral 







a. Genoud v. Edgen Grp., Inc., No. 625,244, 2014 WL 
2782221 (La. Dist. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014) 
5. New York 
a. Hemg Inc. v. Aspen Univ., No. 650457/13, 2013 WL 





a. N. v. McNamara, No. 1:13-CV-833, 2014 WL 4684377 
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2014), available at  




a. Roberts v. TriQuent Semiconductor, Inc., No. 1402-
02441 (Ore. Cir. Ct. Aug. 14, 2014), available at 
http://www.wlrk.com/docs/Triquint_oregon.pdf 
8. Texas 
a. Daugherty v. Ahn, Cause No. CC-11-06211 (Cnty. Ct. 
No. 3, Dallas Cnty. Tex., Feb. 15, 2013) 
b. In re MetroPCS Commc’ns, Inc., 391 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. 
App. 2013). 
9. Maryland (arbitration bylaws)  
a. Katz v. Common Wealth REIT, No. 24–C–13–001299, 




b. Corvex Mgmt. LP v. Commonwealth REIT, Case No. 24-
C-13-001111 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/businesstech/pdfs/mdbt4-
13.pdf 
 
